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PREFACE
This report has been written in the framework of the National Research Programme Global Air
Pollution and Climate Change (NOP) of the Netherlands, by the Centre of Environmental Science
(Leiden University).
The report describes the results of a study into the function of forests in non-Annex I countries
within the global climate policy. It questions the desirability of the concept of sinks within the
Clean Development Mechanism and looks at alternative uses of tropical forestry to halt the
emission of GHGs.
The report is based on information gained from a literature survey. Furthermore, a expert
workshop organized to discuss the concept report has been proven very valuable. This is true as
well for individual interviews held with various Dutch government officials from different
ministries and representatives of other organizations. The participants' contributions to this
report, are much appreciated. A list of participants, as well as a list of used literature can be found
at the end of this report. Thanks are also due to the two anonymus reviewers of the draft report,
who supplied many useful comments.
One note of caution concerns the periods of writing and publishing of this report. The report was
drafted before COP6-bis in Bonn and the date of publication is after that event. Although the
results of CP6-bis have been added to the present version, imperfections of understanding and
style may have resulted. Especially with respect to the core issues of this report, however, the
results of COP6-bis do not appear to be of major import for the analysis.
For questions or comments on this report, please contact prof.dr. Wouter T. de Groot:
e-mail: Degroot@cml.leidenuniv.nl
telephone: (00)+31 (0) 71 527 7487
ABSTRACT
This report aims to determine the function of tropical forestry in the climate and other global
conventions. Because the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol is the major
instrument linking the developing countries (hence the tropical forest) to the climate issue, CDM
will be a major focus. First, the general feasibility of plantations as carbon storage facilities (i.e.
sinks) is examined. Formal constraints concerning permanence, leakage and baseline calculation
are recognized. Furthermore, the external effects in the tropics are deemed predominantly
negative. Plantations included under CDM as sinks may be a hindrance for achieving sustainable
development and may contradict other international conventions such as CBD and CCD.
Subsequently, the report explores two alternative implementations of forests in the mitigation of
GHGs. Both are based on output financing.
The first concerns using tropical plantations as sources of renewable (biomass) energy or energy
saving material. A framework is developed for operating this 'zero pollution' contribution to the
global climate, which is compatible with the CDM criteria, in CDM. Doing so, no substantial
need exists any more to operate CDM through the sinks concept and with that, key problems
surrounding the sink concept are avoided.
Second, a multi-convention global facility is proposed to preserve existing forests. The key
principle here is that net forest benefit producing countries receive disbursements from nel forest
benefit consuming countries on the basis of standing forest per hectare per year. The facility can
not be placed in the structure of CDM and disbursements may be based on several global benefits
next to carbon storage, such as safeguarding biodiversity, preventing desertification and
preserving cultural diversity.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this report is to examine the role of forestry in non-Annex I countries (roughly:
developing countries) within the framework of the UNFCCC and other conventions. More
specifically, it aims to evaluate the application of the concept of forests as sinks (carbon storage
facilities) in the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, and to identify alternative
opportunities in relation to forestry activities. Forests-as-sinks have been examined under the
assumption that most of them would be established in the form of plantations. The report has
identified formal as well as non-formal constraints of sinks in COM, besides certain benefits.
Two important constraints of the sinks concept in CDM concern inconsistency with the
regulations of the Kyoto Protocol. First, the lack of permanence connected to sinks. Sequestered
carbon can be released back into the air as a result of natural or anthropogenic influences.
Secondly, the problem of leakage. This means that sequestration benefits can be offset by market
effects and activity shifting. Other formal constraints include baseline calculation, additionality
and the incentives for moral hazard. The non-formal constraints of including sinks are derived
from adverse socio-economic, cultural and environmental effects. The most important are a
crowding out effect of projects directed towards transfer of clean technology and the creation of a
institutional, technological and economic lock-in effect. On a different scale but no less real, the
establishment of carbon storage facilities may result in the impoverishment and/or displacement
of indigenous people and rural dwellers. Finally, there is an incentive to replace primary forest
for plantations which would accrue to disturbances in the forests' watershed and biodiversity
functions.
The overall assessment of plantations as sinks is negative, although it is acknowledged that
plantations have certain economic advantages. This justifies the search for alternative use of
forestry in CDM.
Alternative ways of implementing forests in climate policy are based on 'output financing1. They
comprise plantations treated as sustainable energy resources and a facility directed towards the
conservation of existing forests. The former may be incorporated in CDM, while the latter
requires a structure of its own.
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Most tropical plantations are used to produce biomass energy or other products that substitute for
fossil fuel. Such plantations may be (co-)financed through COM by way of this substitution
phenomenon, with disbursements taking place at the actual time the substitution is realized.
Fossil fuel substitution projects are normal elements of COM already. Thus, the need is removed
to (co-)finance plantations through the sink concept, which alleviates most of the constraints
connected to sinks.
An operational framework has been developed in the report, which essentially has the same
conceptual structure as normal COM projects. The key to the mechanism is the certification of
areas of envisaged plantations, which guarantees financial rewards at the moment these trees are
converted into energy or prevent the use of fossil fuels otherwise. This conceptualization
intrinsically solves the problems of permanence and determination of the baseline. Other formal
problems are curtailed to 'normal CDM size'.
Furthermore, the non-formal problems have been strongly reduced. On a small scale {local socio-
economic and environmental effects), these problems are offset by including several 'no harm'
criteria in the certification procedure, and the (facultative) addition of a development bonus
which rewards plantation investors for investing in additional benefits. On another scale, clean
technology transfer is promoted instead of being crowded out and the lock-in effects are
drastically reduced. Small-scale economic entities such as local communities or farmers will be
able to meet the certification criteria easier than large-scale and corporate investors.
Building on the principle of 'paying for functions', a multi-convention global facility is proposed
in this report, aimed at the avoidance of irrational conversion of existing forests. It acknowledges
the fact that the global forest functions should be financially rewarded. One of these functions is
the important role of existing forests in the global carbon cycle. The facility is based on the
straightforward principle that countries that are net consumers of forest benefits (such as
preventing global warming), reward net producers of these benefits. When put into practice the
latter group receives disbursements on the basis of standing forest per hectare per year. The
facility may be started on a country-to-country basis.
SAMENVATTING
Dit rapport heeft tot doel te onderzoeken welke rol bossen in ontwikkelingslanden kunnen
hebben binnen het kader van de mondiale klimaatconferentie en andere mondiale conventies te
onderzoeken. Het maakt een evaluatie van het concept van bossen als 'sinks' (afvangers van
koolstof) in het Clean Development Mechanism van het Kyoto Protocol. Verder behandelt het
rapport mogelijkheden voor opname van bossen in het CDM en verschillende mondiale
conventies. Er is gewerkt met de (realistische) veronderstelling dat bossen als sinks de vorm van
plantages hebben. Het rapport identificeert zowel formele bezwaren als niel-formele bezwaren
van bossen als sinks in het CDM en daarnaast ook een aanlal voordelen.
Het Kyoto Protocol kent rationele en heldere regels voor het CDM. Twee belangrijke bezwaren
van het sinks concept hebben betrekking op strijdigheid met die regels. Ten eerste, het gebrek aan
pcrmanentie. Opgeslagen koolstof kan weer vrijkomen in de atmosfeer onder invloed van
natuurlijke processen of menselijk handelen. Ten tweede, het probleem van 'lekkage*. Dil
betekent dat de opslag van koolstof teniet kan worden gedaan door het verplaatsen van
activiteiten of markleffecten. Andere formele problemen betreffen de berekening van de baseline,
additionaliteit en impulsen voor ongewenst gedrag. De nict-formele bezwaren tegen sinks zijn
gebaseerd op sociaal-economische, culturele en milieueffecten. De belangrijkste zijn de
verdringing van projecten die gerichl zijn op de overdracht van schone technologie naar
ontwikkelingslanden en hel risico dat ontwikkelingslanden vast komen te zitten in een inferieure
en starre plantage-economie. Op een lager niveau planten van grote plantages kunnen leiden tot
een het verdrijven of een weIvaartsafname van de inheemse bevolking en boeren in
ontwikkelingslanden. Tenslotte ontstaat er een impuls om bestaande tropische bossen te
vervangen door plantages, met nadelige gevolgen voor biodiversiteit en hydrologie.
De uiteindelijke evaluatie van plantages als sinks valt negatief uit, alhoewel wordt erkend dat
plantages ook zekere voordelen kunnen hebben. Dit rechtvaardigt het zoeken naar een vorm van
opname van bossen in het CDM die veel van de bovenstaande problemen niet met zich
meebrengt.
In dit rapport zijn alternatieve manieren om tropische bossen te betrekken in het klimaatbeleid
gebaseerd op 'output financiering', dat wil zeggen, het betalen voor concrete resultaten in plaats
van voor onzekere plannen, verwachtingen en beloftes. Output financiering kan worden toegepast
als stimulans voor nieuwe bossen en de bescherming van bestaande bossen.
Plantages kunnen worden gefinancierd op basis van hun vermogen om biomassa te leveren die
het verbranden van fossiele energiebronnen (en dus CO2) uitspaart. Indien uitbetalingen plaats
vinden in de mate en op het ogenblik dat deze besparing optreedt, lost dit de meeste problemen
die zijn gerelateerd aan sinks op. Plantages worden dan behandeld op dezelfde wijze als reguliere
CDM projecten.
De kern van het mechanisme is de certificatie van gebieden van geplande biomassa plantages, die
een financiële beloning garandeert voor het moment waarop de bomen worden gebruikt voor het
opwekken van energie of waarop op een andere manier het gebruik van fossiele brandstoffen
uitgespaard wordt. Deze conceptualisatie betekent een intrinsieke oplossing van de problemen
met betrekking tot permanentje en baseline. Andere formele problemen worden gereduceerd tot
het formaat van normale CDM projecten.
Bovendien worden de non-formele problemen gedeeltelijk opgelost. Op lokale schaal worden de
problemen voorkomen door het opnemen van enkele 'geen schade' criteria in de
certificatieprocedure, en een facultatieve ontwikkelingsbonus. Dit laatste is een beloning voor
investeerders die investeren in additionele baten voor de lokale mensen en de natuur. Op een
hoger niveau wordt de overdracht van schone technologie bevorderd (in tegenstelling tot het
verdringen) en het 'starheidsrisico' worden sterk beperkt. Kleinschalige economische actoren,
zoals lokale gemeenschappen of boeren, zullen gemakkelijker aan de certificatiecriteria voldoen
dan grootschalige investeerders.
De vernietiging van bestaande tropische bossen wordt (met name vanwege de
certificeringcriteria) door het voorgestelde CDM-mechanisme niet sterk bevorderd, maar ook niet
afgeremd. Deze ontbossing vormt echter een belangrijke bedreiging voor hel mondiale klimaat en
tevens voor andere mondiale functies. Op basis van het 'paying for functions'-principe stelt dit
rapport een mondiaal mechanisme voor dat wordt ondersteund vanuit verschillende conventies.
Het mechanisme is gericht op de bescherming van bestaande bossen. Het erkent dal mondiale
bosfunctie financieel moeten worden beloond. Een van deze functies is de belangrijke rol in de
mondiale koolstofcyclus. Het mechanisme is gebaseerd op het eenvoudige principe dat landen die
netto voordelen van bossen consumeren hiervoor betalen aan landen die deze netto produceren
per hectare staand bos per jaar. Dit mechanisme kan al op bilaterale basis worden opgestart
INTRODUCTION
The iraplemenlalion of UNFCCC's Kyoto Protocol, which has been established at CoP 3, is
highly controversial and still in the negotiation phase. One of the most intensely debated issues at
CoP 6 has been the degree to which Land-Use and Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)
activilies should be included as an instrument to reach Quantified Emission Limitation and
Reduction Commitments (QELRCs), the abatement targets of countries included in Annex I of
the Protocol. The topic divided Annex I countries, non-Annex I countries and NGOs both
externally and internally.
Consensus now appears to be growing (see, for instance. Decision 5/CP.6 of COP6-bis) that
LULUCF activities are eligible to reach QELRCs, albeit heavily capped and discounted due to
the many uncertainties surrounding baseline, permanence and other aspects of sinks (e.g. Noble
and Scholes, 2001). This pertains only to the non-tropical (Annex I) countries, however, and is
therewith not directly relevant for the tropical forest that is the focus of present report. For the
tropical (developing, non-Annex I) countries, the link with the climate issue runs through Article
12 of the Kyoto Protocol, describing the Clean Development Mechanism (COM). This
mechanism is directed towards gaining emission reductions in non-Annex I countries through
finaces from Annex I countries thai then may subtract the emission reduction from their own
national obligations. Article 12 of the Protocol describes, inter alia, the criteria that COM
projects should comply with.
One of the main issues in this respect has been the question if LULUCF activities should be
included in CDM. Decision 5/CP.6 of COP6-bis limits the application to forestry (which does not
bring problems to the present report), but no further progress is made. The decision only repeats
the criteria for CDM projects, which will be discussed lateron in this report. It may be noted here
as well that the decision does not necessitate an implementation of CDM involvement in tropical
forests in terms of sinks; other ways of implementation are still open.
This report questions the desirability of the sink concept as a cornerstone of implementations in
CDM, and will propose an alternative. This is one of three main focus points of the report.
Fist of all, the report provides some background chapters in order to embed the research findings.
Chapter 2 briefly explains the different forest functions and connects these functions with
existing multinational conventions. Chapter 3 goes deeper into the role of forests in the Kyoto
Protocol and introduces the principle of 'paying for functions'. Subsequently a number of
questions is posed in order to determine the role of sinks in CDM. In Chapter 4, the report
questions the possibility of including sinks in accordance with the criteria of Article 12 of the
Protocol, that pertains to CDM. Chapter 5 then goes on to look more generally at positive and
negative effects of sinks as plantations. It takes into account economic, social, cultural and
environmental effects. These effects are often linked to visions regarding forests in the climate
context.
After having thus examined the concept of sinks, the report turns tu finding alternative ways to
include the tropical forests in the Protocol and other conventions. Two applications are proposed
and clarified. Both applications are based on output financing.
The second focus point then concerns the forests and CDM. Plantations and regenerating forests
can be deployed as production centres of biomass under CDM. However, for inclusion under the
CDM mechanism they need not be treated as sinks. They may also be included while treated as
sources of energy that prevent fossil fuel emissions. Chapter 6 develops a framework for these
operations and looks at the effect of plantations-as-energy source-concept on the feasibility under
CDM and its possible impacts, compared to those of the planlalions-as-sinks-concept.
Chapter 7 aims to give a solution for existing forests in non-Annex I countries. There is a clear
lack of incentives to protect these forests. A international framework outside the CDM is
proposed, based on the principle of 'paying for functions', including the climate.
The report concludes its main findings in Chapter 8. Furthermore, this chapter gives indications
for further research.
GENERAL FOREST FUNCTIONS
Interactions between humans and forest may be perceived in terms of frontier economics,
environmental protection, resource management, eco-development or deep ecology (Colby,
1990).Forests are multiple resources; De Groot & Kamminga (1995) give a systematic overview
of the functions of (tropical) forests of their various system levels between the global and the
local. Most of the global functions of forests have been recognized and accounted for in various
international conventions. This does not only concern resource functions, but dynamic functions
in the global ecosystem, particularly the carbon cycle, the nutrient cycle and the hydrological
cycle. This chapter gives a bird's eye view of the functions of forest and tries to connect them to
these existing international conventions. It may be important to note that the magnitude and size
of these functions are subject to spatial variation. This chapter then addresses arguments for
incorporating forests in the Kyoto Protocol (including CDM).
2.1 Safeguarding biodiversity
One of the major functions of forests is being a habitat for a huge variety of life forms. This
biological diversity is of intrinsic, cultural and economic value. During the 1992 Conference in
Rio, this awareness contributed to the formulation of the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD).
The CBD defines biodiversity as 'the variability among living organisms from all sources,
including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological
complexes cf which they are part; this includes diversity within species (genetic diversity),
between species (species diversity) and of ecosystems'. The knowledge regarding the current
state of biodiversity on earth is limited. Most of the world's species have not been described yet.
This especially concerns lower plants, fungi, invertebrates and micro-organisms. On the level of
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ecosystems our knowledge is more complete (Glowka et al., 1994). It is apparent that
biodiversity is not evenly spread around the globe, and that there are so-called 'hot spots'. These
hot spots show exceptional concentrations of species with high levels of endemism and they
include certain tropical forests (Myers, 1988). According to the CBD:
"tropical, temperate and boreal forests provide the most diverse sets of habitats for plants,
animals and micro-organisms, holding the vast majority of the world's terrestrial species. This
diversity is the fruit of evolution, but also reflects the combined influence of the physical
environment and people. "
Under the framework of the CBD, countries are obliged to develop national programs for the
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Every strategic decision in their policy should
formally take biodiversity into account, in accordance with this programme (Raustiala and
Victor, 1996). If a country is financially incapable of fulfilling its obligations in this respect, it
can request the Global Environment Facility for financial assistance (ww\v.biodiv.com).
2.2 Combating land degradation
The concept of land degradation covers three aspects: soil erosion, soil degradation and
watershed deterioration.
Soil erosion is the horizontal transport of soil particles by water or wind. Erosion is often
associated with decreasing agriculture productivity in situ and with siltation problems
downstream. As shown, for instance, in the Universal Soil Loss Equation, forest is the optimum
vegetation cover that prevents erosion (e.g. Slocking, 2000; Lai, 1990)
Soil degradation is a deterioration of the nutrient and carbon levels in soils, of which especially
the carbon content is connected also to physical properties such as water infiltration and retention
capacities. The nutrient cycle is depicted in Figure 2.2. In order to grow, biomass needs elements
which are available from water and the atmosphere (C, N). Numerous other nutrients originale
from organic litter of biomass. When biomass falls on the ground surface, it is transformed into
nutrients by micro-organisms. U subsequently infiltrates the sub-soil as a result of rainfall. The
organic matter remains on the ground and prevents the nutrients from washing away during
precipitation. The nutrients are then re-extracted from the soil by vegetation and consumed by the
hiomass.
Nutrienl cycles may 'run up', i*. accumulating a net increasing nutrient and carbon level every
year, or 'down', i.e. with a lower overall nutrient and carbon content every year. The former
tends to be the case in forests, and the latter on arable land, especially in the tropics where rainfall
is high and/or fertilizer inputs are low. This illustrates the crucial role of forests in the overall
sustainability of tropical land-use systems: overall equilibrium is reached if the downward
tendency of arable land is connected to the upward tendency of forests, e.g. through fallowing in
a forest/field sequence over time, or through cattle and manure in a forest/Field connection in
space. The survival of the Sahel and the massive soil degradation in Amazonia are both
connected to this phenomenon.
The hydrological 'watershed' function of forests usually works on a regional, river-wide scale.
The essence of the local hydrological cycle is depicted by figure 2.1. Precipitation may be taken
as the starling point of the hydrological cycle. After precipitation has fallen, the water can be
intercepted by the canopy cover and evaporate. Part of the water will reach the lop soil and will
infiltrate the soil to varying extents. Some water will remain at the surface, running of in streams
of water. Water from the sub-soil will be partially absorbed by vegetation. The remaining water
will eventually be added too springs or other surface water. The water that has been slored in
vegetation temporarily, will be released back into the atmosphere by a transpiration process. The
surface water will be released back into the atmosphere by evaporation.
Il may be borne in mind that due to deeper roots, trees create a higher level of evapotranspiration
than grasses and other vegetation. This implies that the first effect of deforestation is often that
river discharges increase, both in the wet season and in the dry season ('base flow'). In the course
of time soil degradation will set in, resulting in decreasing infiltration rates, which in turn result
in even higher wet-season flows, but usually a lower dry-season flow. Then soil degradation will
begin to show its effects on the river bed, raising the river bed, particularly in Ihe lower river
reaches, so that peak flows, now being discharged over a higher river bed compared to the
adjacent land, will result in "flash floods" and create the well-known images of destroyed
bridges, crops and human lives.
Figure 2.1: The hydrological cycle Figure 2.2: The nutrient cycle
Source: Shivaelal., 1991
Against this background il is only logical that prolecuon of forests is a key element in the United
Nations Convention lo Combat Desertification (CCD). It estimates thai more than one billion
people are directly or indirectly at risk because of land degradation, the most important risk being
a (long-term) lack of food security. The importance of forests for the conservation of fresh water
reservoirs and important river basins, has also been acknowledged by the Forest Declaration of
1992 (Agenda 21, 1993). Countries affected by land degradation will implement the CCD by
developing and carrying out national, sub-regional, and regional action programs. Developed
countries are expected lo encourage the mobilization of substantial funding for these action
programs. They should also promote access to appropriate technologies, knowledge, and know-
how (www.unccd.int). Momentarily, negotiations are taking place to have land degradation
accepted as an additional window of the Global Environment Facility.
2.3 Direct economic functions of forests
Forests are essential for economic development, according to the Forest Declaration (Agenda 21,
1993). Indeed, forests have a very high commercial value, esj>ecially if they are managed in a
sustainable manner. In many developing countries, forestry is a major stepping stone to economic
development. Forest yields contain energy as a result of the burning of bio-mass, but also forest
products such as food, wood, non-timber products, medicines and increasingly important genetic
material, amongst others.
Forest users include women, men, indigenous people and colonizers. Product extractions, slash-
and-burn agriculture and commercial operators in sectors such as logging, tourism and pharmacy,
ranging from local to multinational scale are having an adverse impact on the world's forest
resources. This will prevent future generations to fulfil their needs and aspirations, which is
contrary to sustainable development (Brundtland, 1987). Therefore, the basic problem to be
solved by forestry is the lack of balance between social demands on forests and the actual state of
forests (Wiersum, 1999). In the non-legally binding Forest Declaration, there is a consensus that
this would result in high costs for developing nations because of the uneven spread of forest
around the globe and that subsequently, developed countries have an obligation to share in these
costs (Agenda 21, 1993; see also Chapter 7).
2.4 Preserving world cultural heritage and diversity.
Forests also have cultural, spiritual, aesthetic and scientific values to mankind. Forests are closely
interlinked with a great variety of indigenous cultures around the globe. This has been
acknowledged by most international conventions related to forests. For example, the CBD states
that 'Vac/i country shall subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying
traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity,..."(article 8.j). The UN draft declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples (1993),
which is currently being negotiated in the UN Genera] Assembly, states that "Indigenous Peoples
have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual and material relationships
with the lands (etc.), which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used'1. The
declaration continues this line of thinking, with articles that should maintain the rights of
Indigenous Peoples with respect to land use, restitution of land, conservation, etc.
The aesthetic and scientific value of forest are protected by the Convention Concerning the
Proteclion of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (www.unesco.org). This convention only
protects natural sites or features which are of outstanding universal value. The international
community has set up the World Heritage Fund to assist countries to bear the costs of
maintaining their heritage.
2.5 The climate functions of forests.
Forests highly influence micro climate conditions. In the dry tropics, for instance, the shade,
additional moisture in the air and lower temperatures that are supplied by forests on the micro
scale are among the reasons why many villages are surrounded by a protected forest patch.
Shade and moisture from forests do not have a measurable effect on large-scale climate, except
for very large forests on a continental scale. This has been measured and modeled especially for
the Amazonian basin. Deforestation on that scale leads to such an amount of decreased
evapotranspiration (see previous section) that, in due course, less rainfall is returned from the
atmosphere. The ensuing dryer conditions increase the forest vulnerability for fires, thus
reinforcing the deforestation process. In the Open Science Meeting (Amsterdam 2001), a
feedback between forest and climate has been discused also with respect to West-Africa.
The major connection between forest and climate is through the global carbon cycle. Carbon is
Ihe most important greenhouse gas, capturing sun heat and hence making life on earth possible.
Disturbances in the atmospheric concentration of carbon will result in changing global
temperature and consequently to other climate changes. Figure 2.3 shows a schematic
representation of the global carbon cycle, without anthropogenic disturbances.
The terrestrial biosphere absorbs CO2 from the atmosphere, which is transformed in a process of
photosynthesis into new biomass. The stored carbon is partly released back into the atmosphere
through respiration and partly by decaying organic litter (detritus). Finally, a part of carbon will
remain captured in the soi]. Recent research has indicated that this effect is smaller than scientists
have assumed over the last years (Oren et al., 2001). The described cycle is called "the short
carbon cycle".
The long carbon cycle includes the ocean. There remain a lot of questions about the relevance of
the ocean in the total carbon cycle, although it is acknowledged that this process is of major
importance. The ocean absorbs and releases carbon from the atmosphere as well. The absorbed
carbon is retained in marine biomass or other organic life forms. In time this will be either
released back into the atmosphere or be transformed into stable and long-term lithospheric carbon
sinks through a process of sedimentation. The carbon sinks that originate from these processes
remain largely in place over extensive periods of time.
Figure 2.3: The global carbon cycle.
Source: http://plaza.un.cdu/mrosenme/Carbon.htm (University of Florida). See also Noble and ScJioles (2001 ) for an
overview with more emphasis on quantification and human influence.
Human activities have an impact on carbon stocks, through land use, land-use change and
forestry (LULUCF) and other activities. This affects the short-term carbon cycle. Large amounts
of carbon have been released as a result of forest clearing. In recent decades this mainly
concerned tropical forests. IPCC (2000) estimates that this deforestation has contributed
substantially to the emission of carbon into the atmosphere. Although the estimates are uncertain,
IPCC mentions a contribution of 1.7 Gt C (+/- 0.8) and 1.6 Gt C (+/- 0.8) for the 1980s and the
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1990s respectively. Nevertheless during this period forests may have functioned as a small net
sink. This can be attributed to land-use change activities and natural regrowth in the middle and
high latitudes as well as the changing climate (IPCC, 2000), e.g. the 0.2 Gt C per year stored in
net growth of forests in Annex I countries, mentioned by Noble and Scholes (2001) . The effect
of deforestation differ between different types of forests. Table 2.1 shows the amounts of carbon
contained by aboveground and below-ground stocks of biomass.
Table 2.1 : Global carbon stored in forest vegetation and soil down to a depth of 1 meter,
in G t C.





















Note: Considerable uncertainty exists in the numbers given, e.g. because of ambiguity of du tmi t inns of biomes, but
the still provides an overview of the magnitude of carbon suxks in forests. Source: IPCC (2000).
The long-term carbon cycle is disturbed by the burning of carbon (i.e. fossil fuels), which have
been formed over extensive periods of time, but are now released back into the atmosphere
within two generations lime (Metz, 2001).
The attention will now again be focussed on the negative and positive impact of forestry activities
on climate change. It is evident that anthropogenic activities with respect to forests strongly
impacts the carbon cycle. This has been acknowledged by the Kyoto Protocol. The next chapter
will discuss the place of LULUCF activities in the Protocol.
LAND-USE, LAND-USE CHANGE AND FORESTRY
ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
From the foregoing chapter it may be clear that forests play an important role in the regulation of
the climate. This function of forests has been acknowledged by the Kyoto Protocol. Throughout
the Protocol, the reduction of emissions is treated in a similar way as enhancing GHGs uptake
through sinks. Still, many issues are to be resolved. The IPCC Special Report on Land-Use,
Land-Use Change and Forestry {IPCC, 2001) gives an extensive assessment of the state of the
current scientific knowledge on these issues. This chapter will focus on these issues briefly.
Furthermore, it will try to add some remarks on the political context surrounding LULUCF.
Section 3.1 looks at the function of forests as sinks within the Protocol framework. Forests, or
broadly speaking any biomass has another function in the Protocol. It may also substitute for
some energy-in tensive products. Moreover, in the form of biofuel it can prevent the use of fossil
fuels. This is the topic of section 3.2. Subsequently the politics of sinks will be briefly
highlighted. Inclusion of sinks as a means of combating climate change can be categorized as
highly politicized. The final section looks at the integrated function of forests and introduces the
idea of "paying for functions".
3.1 Sinks and the Kyoto Protocol
In Chapter 2, attention has been paid to the functioning of the carbon cycle. Forests and other
biomass play an important role in this cycle, and consequently biomass is an integral part of the
Kyoto Protocol. According to Article 3.3 of the Protocol:
"The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks resulting from
direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation
reforestation and deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable changes in carbon stocks in
each commitment period, shall be used to meet the commitments under this Article of each Party
included in Annex I. The greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks associated
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wirt those activities shall be reported in a transparent and verifiable manner and reviewed in
accordance with Articles 7 and 8".
In this Article, several principles surrounding sinks and sources have been addressed in a way,
which leaves little room for differences in interpretation. Though not directly connected to the
present report's main subject, it is worthy to note that the Article has become the centre of some
controversy. On the one hand this results from the use of different definitions. On the other hand,
certain regulations of the Article have been a fierce topic of debate in recent years.
It is rather easy to point out the relevance of using definitions which have been commonly agreed
upon, Indeed, complete forests can be "lost" or "gained" in the process of defining them. The
IPCC (2000) mentions land-use change, forests, forestry (including afforestation, reforestation
and deforestation), carbon stocks, human-induced and direct human-induced as issues that have
lo be defined by the Parlies to the Protocol. These terms form the very basis of the Article. For
example, there are many possible definitions of a forest. The choice how to define a forest will
determine how much land should be accounted for by Annex I countries, when they assess the
extent to which the have fulfilled to their QELRCs. Countries define forests in terms of their
legal or cultural stature and measure them in terms of canopy cover or biomass density. These
definitions were not designed with the Protocol in mind. This means their is an institutional gap
which has to be treated. This can only be the result of international agreement on the standards
and the instruments used to measure the developments of forests and on the extent to which these
developments have to be accounted for. Comparable problems surround the other issues
mentioned. COP6-bis has made progress on definitory issues (see, for instance, the Annex of
draft decision FCCC/CP/2001/L.l l.Rev.l, where terms such as forest, cropland management etc.
are discussed).
Although under the regulations of Article 3.3, land-use change and forestry activities have been
restricted to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation (ARD) since 1990. It seems that other
LULUCF activities will now be considered for inclusion in Article 3.4 (Schlamadinger &
Marland, 2000). Article 3.4 states that:
"The CoP shall decide upon modalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and which,
additional human-induced activities related to changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources
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and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and the land-use change and forestry categories
shall be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for Parties included m Annex /,.... "
The decision which is made as a consequence of Article 3.4 will apply in the second and
subsequent commitment periods, i.e. after 2012. The set of eligible LULUCF activities is likely
to be enlarged in these commitment periods, although it is far from clear what these activities will
be precisely. Excluding other activities than ARD in the first commitment period allows further
research to reduce uncertainties surrounding LULUCF activities (Metz et al., 2001)
3.2 Bio-energy and the Kyoto Protocol
Another forest function which is acknowledged within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol is
the potential lo convert biomass into a sustainable form of energy. Hence, when this biofuel
displaces fossil fuel, the mitigation of GHGs is captured as a decrease in the use of fossil fuels.
According to the IPCC (2000): "Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol clearly distinguishes between
biofuels and fossil fuels, establishing that biofuels are part of the cycling of carbon in the
biosphere". This fuel substitution could entail large-scale land-use change and the creation of a
large production apparatus, as will be further elaborated in Chapter 6. This has both positive and
negative potential effects with regards to sustainable development, biodiversity, land availability
and productivity, etc.
IPCC (2000) recognizes that mere storage of carbon in sinks may not always be the most
effective strategy for mitigating GHG emissions. IPCC considers that over lime, greater
mitigation is possible by managing the entire system. This may be done in three ways, next to
carbon storage in standing biomass: (1) carbon stored in wood products and landfills, (2) using
biofuels instead of fossil fuels and (3) by replacing fossil fuel-intensive materials for forest
products and other bio-products. Recently, the debate around "cascading" has produced new
ideas in addition to the substitution of energy-intensive products for biomass. The principle of
cascading is based on efficiency. Biomass is used for different function in different stages of
existence. It may first be put to use in construction, where it stores carbon for a number of years.
After its function as construction wood has faded, the construction material can be transformed
into paper, which after having been recycled for a number of times will be used as a bio-fuel.
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3.3 The politics of sinks
The Kyoto Protocol considers sinks to be a legal manner of offsetting carbon emissions by Annex
1 countries. There is agreement on the fact lhat carbon sequestration by sinks is eligible under
Joint Implementation as well. Still, sinks have become a debated topic in the climate
negotiations. Both within the Annex I countries and the non-Annex I countries disagreement
exists on certain issues. This disagreement is of political origin rather than of scientific, although
there are still many scientific uncertainties that exacerbate the political ones (e.g. Richards and
Andersson, 2001).
Annex I countries are divided over the question to which extent they should be allowed to offset
their emissions by the use of Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism, i.e.
finding solutions in non-Annex I countries abroad. It may be obvious that the outcome of this
discussion is of great importance to the relevance of LULUCF activities implemented in order to
mitigate climate change.
An other dispute is of direct importance for the tropical (non-Annex I) forests. It concerns the
question whether or not LULUCF activities (in their role as carbon sinks) should be included in
COM. Proponents of inclusion are motivated by pre-existing commitments, by forest
management concerns, or by the belief that they might not be able to attract COM otherwise
(Hare, 2000). Opponents of inclusion often use arguments, which can be found throughout this
report (especially in Chapters 4 and 5). The latter group finds itself supported by the European
Union. The EU is opposed by other Annex I countries. In COP6-bis, the inclusion of forestry (not
other land use) in COM has been upheld, however without visible progress on the
implementation.
One other route to relate forests to CDM is through the Adaptation Fund under COM, directed
towards financing measures, taken by developing countries to offset the adverse effect of climate,
change. These measures could then include forest activities. The Adaptation Fund will involve
only a. small percentage of the CDM proceeds, however, and this 'detour* for reaching the
tropical forest will not be pursued in the present report.
Another option to bring the tropical forest under CDM would be to focus on the substitution of
fossil fuel by renewable (biomass) bio-fuels (Metz et ai, 2001) rather than on the sink concept.
This solution will be the focus of Chapter 6.
3.4 Paying for functions
As indicated in Chapter 2, forests fulfill a wide array of functions. Some of these are expressed
on the locaJ level (e.g. soil fertility maintenance), while others accrue at a regional (e.g.
watershed functions) or global scale (e.g. climate, biodiversity and cultural diversity). Some of
these functions are supported by well-developed markets, such as the market for agricultural
products and fertilizers supporting soil fertility. Other markets are only partially developed. The
market for eco-tourism, for instances, captures only a small portion of the global value of tropical
forest biodiversity. And finally, other forest functions are presently nol supported by any market
at all, such as the value of carbon sequestration for the prevention of climate change.
"Paying for functions" is a concept in which all forest functions are expressed financially. One
recent development in this respect is, for instance, a mechanism applied in Costa Rica, where
upstream communities are remunerated for their watershed function maintenance by downstream
communities (dr. P.A. Verweij, pers. comm., 2001). Especially with a view on Chapter 6 and
Chapter 7 it may be noted here that paying for functions may be carried out on a one-to-one basis,
that is, one financing mechanism for one function (as in the Costa Rica example). In Chapter 6, a
one-to-one solution will be proposed, while Chapter 7 will focus on a multi-functional ("all
Conventions") mechanism.
Principles to be adhered to in paying for functions especially concern the risk of double-counting.
This develops into two rules:
• Lowest possible system level: Intercommunity benefits should preferably be settled
inlercommunally, as in Costa Rica, going from the regional, national, international to the
global level. This implies that a global mechanism such as CDM, or a global clearing house
such as in Chapter 7, should function on the truly global functions.
• New mechanisms should not duplicate existing markets, such as those of timber, agriculture
or ecotourism. Insofar these markets do not express external effects these may become pari of
paying for functions mechanisms. This may include, of course, levying of negative external
effects.
One other point to note with respect to paying for functions is the issue of "who gets paid for
what". Since the functions of forests are performed by standing forest, a logical answer would be
to remunerate on a per hectare per year basis, irrespective of human activities. On the other hand,
there is logic in paying for human activities ( e.g. by compensating opportunity costs). This rises
the question who actually owns the forest. Paying for functions mechanisms have to make clear
choices in this respect.
Finally, it may be borne in mind that there is no moral and ethical obligation to pay or get paid
for every forest function. A beautiful tree in one's private garden also beautifies the town; yet we
do not get paid a beauty bonus by the municipality. In other words, what to remunerate depends
on what may be regarded as basic obligations of lower-level entities (individuals, communities,
states) towards the higher-level collective good (communities, nations, global level).
FORESTS AND THE FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS OF THE
KYOTO PROTOCOL
4.1 General aspects
The Kyoto Protocol stales that Annex I countries shall ensure that their anthropogenic carbon
dioxide equivalent emissions of GHGs do not exceed their assigned amounts. These amounts are
equal to the GHG emissions an Annex I country contributed in 1990, minus its Quantified
Emission Limitation and Reduction Commitments (QELRCs) as agreed under Annex A of the
Protocol.
Domeslic GHG emission and uptake resulting from land use, land use change and forestry
(LULUCF) activities are included in the calculations of both the baseline and the results. The
question arises whether the Kyoto Protocol permits Annex I countries to pursue emission
reduction objectives through LULUCF activities abroad, using the flexible instruments. The
Kyoto Protocol includes three instruments that give Annex I countries the opportunity to reach
part of their abatement targets in other countries. The logic behind these instruments is based on
optimizing cost efficiency. Since the purpose of this report is to shed light of the role of forests in
the Clean Development Mechanism (COM) instrument, this chapter does not elaborate on the
flexible instruments in general. Before dealing with the issue of emission reductions in CDM, the
role of forestry with respect to International Emissions Trading (IET) and Joint Implementation
(JI) will be addressed only briefly. Since the introduction of the Kyoto Protocol many countries
have experimented with the use of these instruments under the guidance of the UNFCCC. These
projects are referred to under the name of Activities Implemented Jointly (A1J). Many of them
are LULUCF activities. The United Slates' LULUCF projects, for example, involve about 4
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million hectares up till now (IPCC, 2000). They are conducted in Annex I countries as well as in
non-Annex I countries. The final section of this chapter will elaborate on these AIJ projects.
4.2 Forests in the International Emission Trading regime
The first of the flexible instruments to be highlighted is the International Emissions Trading
(1ET). This instrument is only described briefly in the Kyoto Protocol (Art. 17, 3.10, 3.11).
Relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines have not been decided upon yet.
Nevertheless, the principle is clear. If an Annex I country has reduced GHG emissions further
than it had committed itself to under the Kyoto Protocol, it is allowed to sell this 'surplus' to
another Annex 1 country which has emitted more than its amount (Jepma et al, 1998). In much
the same way, credit accruing from projects implemented under the other instruments can be
bought or sold on this market.
Since changes in carbon stocks are accounted for in the compliance regimes, it is likely that any
GHG emissions or reductions associated with LULUCF activities can be part of IET. It should be
borne in mind, though, that there are no final agreements with regards to this issue. It is
important to be aware that only Annex I countries are eligible for IET. This reflects the view of
the OECD (1997) that participation in a trading system by non-Annex I countries (i.e. countries
that have not adopted QELRCs), could reduce the value of allowances and raise the risk that
overall greenhouse gas emissions reductions will not be achieved. This implicates that, under
present conditions, tropical forests can not be included in IET.
4.3 Forests in Joint Implementation
The concept of Joint Implementation (JI) is described in Article 6 of the Protocol. According to
this article, Annex I countries are permitted to transfer Emission Reduction Units (ERUs),
resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions, to other such countries. These
projects can either contribute to emission reduction by sources or to enhance anthropogenic
removals by sinks (Art, 6.1).
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LULUCF activities are an integral part of JI. However, in the absence of a general agreement
which LULUCF activities should be included, the issue is surrounded by vagueness.
4.4 Forests in the Clean Development Mechanism
The purpose of the Clean Development Mechanism (COM) is twofold. On the one hand,
countries not included in Annex I will be assisted in achieving sustainable development and in
contributing to reducing global emission levels. On the other hand, Annex I countries will be
assisted in achieving compliance with their QELRCs (Art. 12.2). By reducing emission levels in
non-Annex I countries. Annex I countries receive Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) which
they can deduct from their QELRCs.
Although Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, which concerns COM, is unclear in this respect, the
results of COP6-bis indicate that forestry is included in COM, insofar, logically, it complies with
the generic regulations, modalities and procedures of CDM as outlined in Article 12. This means
that emission reductions should be "real", "measurable" and yield "long-term benefits related to
the mitigation of climate change". Furthermore, reductions should be "additional"' to any that
would occur in the absence of the certified project activity (Art.12.5). Finally, the projects should
be characterized by "transparency of reporting, accountability, efficiency and verifiability of
results" (Art. 12.7; see also Decision 5/CP.6 of COP6-bis).
Many of these conditions are already difficult to fulfil with regular CDM activities. This is even
more complicated for sinks to be included in CDM. The two main concerns in this respect are
leakage and permanence. Furthermore, baseline calculation and the requirement of additionality
complicate the process of verification (IPCC, 2000).
4.4.1. Leakage
Leakage problems in LULUCF projects can occur as a result of (1) market effects, (2) activity
shifting (Richards and Andersson, 2001).
1 The concept of additionality is subject to different interpretations. In this report an aclivily is additional only if it
would not be economically viable without earning CERs (Sugiyama and Michaelowa, 2001).
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(Ad 1) There is a possibility that large-scale sequestration operations might have negative
impacts on the world timber prices, thereby reducing the incentives of traditional suppliers lo
invest in forest management and new timber production (Sedjo & Sohngen, 2001). This is merely
one of the possible market effects to occur.
(Ad 2) Activity shifting is the spatial shifting of activities. This may occur if farmers are
excluded from a project area designed for LULUCF activities. It is likely that these people then
shift their activities elsewhere, possibly to a forest frontier. The subsequent emission of GHGs
would not be accounted for in the baseline calculation of the LULUCF project.
4.4.2. Permanence
Another serious concern is that of a lack of permanence. This is unique for LULUCF activities. It
is contradicting the requirement that emission reductions should be long-term in nature. Carbon
sequestration in forest and other types of land cover is potentially reversible because carbon
contained in terrestrial ecosystems is vulnerable to disturbances such as wildfires or pest
outbreaks, as well as subsequent changes in management that would return some or all of the
sequestered carbon to the atmosphere in addition to what would have been released if the
sequestration activity had never taken place. This situation contrasts with the case of avoided
fossil fuel emissions because fossil fuels left in the ground in a given year will not be accidentally
released in a subsequent year, even if the emission reduction activity itself is of a limited duration
(Ipcc, 2000). A question of major relevance in this respect is that of liability for the loss of stored
carbon. This can be borne by the investor, the investing country or the receiving country. The
subsequent question would be what the consequences would be in terms of disbursements,
distributed CERs, etc.
Possible solutions for the problem of permanence as identified by IPCC (2000), primarily focus
on risk reduction approaches like good management systems, project diversification, self-
insurance reserves, standard insurance services and involvement of local stakeholders. However
well these approaches may help to mitigate the problem, they do not address its core. Other
solutions to the problem may be debits for all releases, project replacement or delayed/partial
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credit initially (lonne year accounting). All of these measures would bring about a wide variety of
administrative operations.
4.4.3. The need for verification
The need for verification is inherent to the use of the CDM mechanism, since it has been
explicitly mentioned in Article 12. This need stems from three problems. (1) The requirement of
additionally; (2) baseline calculation and (3) moral hazard.
(Ad 1) Article 12.5.c clearly states that reductions in emissions should be additional to any that
would occur in the absence of the certified project activity. This concerns a measurement
problem in first instance. It has to be determined if a project would be economically viable
without financial support from CDM. Even if truly measurable, however, a deeper dilemma
appears. Very cost-effective and multi-functional projects will have great difficulty to prove that
they are additional, while poorly designed projects will easily cross the threshold, thus creating a
perverse incentive. Sugiyama and Michaelowa (2001) analyse this problem and propose to solve
it in the way as practiced de facto in other institutions that work with a de jure additionality
criterion (such as the GEF), namely, by open negotiations and parly's dicretion. We will return to
this in Chapter 6.
(Ad 2 ) Measurement can be an obstacle for successfully implementing forestry activities in
CDM. Measurement of carbon stocks concerns a number of technical aspects. More importantly
it includes the issue of baseline calculation. The difficulty with the baseline is twofold. Firstly
and most importantly, it is nearly impossible to objectively calculate the baseline, because it
would imply making assumptions about what would have happened to the allocated land in the
future. Secondly, it is not entirely calculable how much OHGs will be emitted in the process of
site preparation in the case of establishing a plantation. The latter problem is of technical origin
and may be resolved by technical solution. For a further discussion, see Andersson and Richards
(2001) and Noble and Scholes (2001).
(Ad 3) Assuming that agreeing over forest sinks in CDM is technically feasible, the success of
implementation will be heavily dependent on the degree to which this agreement will he carried
out. This, in turn depends on the integrity of social and institutional organization of people,
corporate structures and governments of the various geographic entities they operate in. In this
respect it should be acknowledged that taking non-Annex 1 countries as a point of departure for
CDM has far-reaching consequences. In order to avoid incentives to locate projects in areas with
less stringent criteria regarding sustainable development, a system of criteria and indicators
should be developed. This need is absent for Jl projects, because in that case the ERUs gained,
are merely transferred from one Annex I country to another. These are all subject to the same set
of criteria. Especially under Article 12 there are incentives for both the Annex I investor and the
non-Annex I host to exaggerate the benefits projects. The investor would receive more credits
toward its national commitment and the project host would sell more certified emission
reductions. As pointed out by Noble and Scholes (2001), the risk of moral hazard is especially
prevalent if financial flows are connected to to outset of projects, as most proposals seem to
imply if they say that CDM should support the establishment of plantations and suchlike
activities. Once the money is in, the investor has little incentive to assure the long-term success,
i.e. the actual carbon sequestration. As a result, the demand for independent verification and
precise monitoring may be staggering if carbon storage facilities are included in CDM, thus
severely increasing transaction costs.
4.4.4. Conclusion
When taking a second look at the conditions a CDM project has to comply with according to the
Kyoto Protocol, it becomes apparent that carbon storage facilities (sinks) will possibly meet with
insurmountable compliance problems. The Protocol states that emission reductions should be
"real", "measurable", "additional" and yield "long-term benefits related to the mitigation of
climate change" and that the projects should be characterized by "transparency of reporting,
accountability, efficiency and verifiability of results". The two core problems, leakage and
permanence, undermine these requirements to a large extent. Emission reduction will be difficult
to measure, because baseline calculation is problematic. Hence, the additionality of a project can
not be measured sufficiently and it remains unclear whether emission reductions are real. The
problem of permanence is intrinsic to carbon storage in biomass. In order to control the process
of developing and performing such projects in CDM, rules and regulations will turn out to be
very complex and require extensive verification and monitoring.
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4.5 AU projects
In the pilot phase of Activities Implemented Jointly (AU), countries co-operated in JI as well as
CDM projects in order to learn more about these flexible mechanisms (Jepma et al., 1998). The
effects of this leaning process have remained limited, as a result of the small number of projects,
the uneven geographic distribution, the short period of field operations and most importantly, the
absence of an internationally agreed set of guidelines to operate the mechanism (Ipcc., 2000).
All of the countries participating in AIJ worked according to their own standards. According to
the IPCC (2000), LULUCF projects implemented as AIJ may be divided into six subcalegories:
(i) reforestation, afforestation, and restoration; (ii) soil carbon management; (iii) forest
conservation; (iv) forest management and alternative harvest practices; (v) agroforeslry; and (vi)
multi-component or community forestry projects that combine several of these activities.
Strikingly, this set of activities exceeds the original ARD activities of Art. 3.3.
The next chapter will use the data that have become available as a result of AIJ projects, to assess




THE GENERAL PLANTATION DILEMMA
The objective of the flexible instruments is to be cost-effectiveness in achieving global benefits.
This means that the costs for project participants and public institutions should be kept as low as
possible. It is likely that this is one of the major considerations for Annex I countries with regard
to the allocation of funds to mitigate their GHG emission.
Experience with AIJ projects shows that the establishment of plantations for carbon storage is the
one of the most cost-efficient solution for a country to reach its QELRC. However, there is a
widespread concern with regard to the social, economic and environmental effects of plantations.
The top-down structure of sinks in the CDM may lead to a tendency to neglect these effects.
Article 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol, determines that 'each party shall strive to implement
commitments mentioned in paragraph 3.1 in such a way as to minimize adverse social,
environmental and economic impacts on developing country Parties,...1. The aim of this chapter
is to examine if plantations can be established without violating Article 3.14.
5.1 Summary of formal problems.
This short section serves as a reminder of the formal problems that surround the inclusion of
LULUCF projects in CDM. These problems have been treated extensively in Chapter 4. Large
technical problems, resulting in risks and high transactions cost, surround the issues of baseline,
additionally and verification. Two main problems of a more substantive nature are leakage and
permanence. Leakage is caused by human action and reaction resulting from LULUCF activities.
The mitigation of the problem of leakage requires substantial verification and monitoring. This is
the case for regular CDM projects as well, although to a lesser extent. The second problem, that
of permanence, concerns the fact that it cannot be guaranteed that carbon is sequestered on the
long term. Carbon may be released because sinks may be afflicted by natural or human-induced
fires, pest outbreaks or other human action. This is contradicting the regulations of Article 12 of
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the Kyoto Protocol. Again, accounting combined with extensive monitoring and verification
could be a partial solution to the problem. Still, is impossible to solve it entirely.
With the formal problems in mind, the attention is now directed towards less tangible problems
related to the inclusion of plantations in CDM. One of the primary objectives of COM is the
promotion of sustainable development in developing countries. Article 3.14 reinforces this
objective. These considerations form the basis of the rest of this chapter.
5.2 Plantations versus clean technology.
There is a concern among NGOs, supported by some scientists, that rent-seeking behaviour of
investors would lead to large investments in plantations. Consequently, this would crowd-out
CDM projects based on technology transfer. This concern is based on the opinion that plantations
would be the cheapest way to create CERs and hence for Annex I countries to meet their
QELRCs. Crowding-out of clean technology transfer by plantations would have two effects. The
first effect is that a clear-cut emission reduction would be changed into a net emission reduction:
gross emissions would slay the same but would only be offset by a carbon storage facility, i.e. the
plantation. The question arises whether such a net reduction is just as real, to put it in Kyoto
terms, as a gross reduction. The second effect of the possible crowding-out is the possibility that
it may hamper a country's long-term sustainable development. This effect is being reviewed in
this chapter.
When comparing the costs of carbon sequestering in forests or plantations and technology
transfer, it is apparent that the estimates vary widely. This means that the cost price of CERs
could vary as well. There are several explanations for this feature.
First of all, no standard method of evaluation has emerged and come into wide use (Ipcc, 2001).
The input for estimation is based on a wide variety of AJJ projects, and the methods such as
discounting, measuring the carbon stock, vary greatly. For example, using tonne/year accounting,
a methodology employed to make corrections for the duration of such projects, would increase
the costs of LULUCF projects (réf. Table 5.1) by at least 50% and maybe even several times
(IPCC, 2000; Smith, 2000).
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Secondly, it depends which costs are included in the calculation. IPCC (2000) distinguishes
between direct costs, opportunity costs and transaction costs, although the latter category is not
referred to as such. Direct costs incurred by the project developers include land purchase or
rental, land clearing or site preparation and operating costs. Opportunity costs are equivalent to
the present value of alternative forms of future land-use. Finally, transaction costs are costs that
are connected with the organization of the project. Controversy exists as to which costs should be
included as transaction costs. IPCC mentions infrastructure costs, maintenance and monitoring
data collection and interpretation costs. Many NGOs (e.g. Goldberg of CIEL, 1998) point out that
independent verification will lead to higher costs, especially with regard to LULUCF activities
which are surrounded by a lot of uncertainty. This is recognized by the UNFCCC as well.
According to FCCC, excessive transaction costs have been identified as a primary cause of
failure of previous project based emission offsets programs (UNFCCC, 2000).
Thirdly, it is important to know to which extent project developers have externalized the costs of
their project. If a significant proportion of the costs would be borne by governments and/or
international organizations, this would lower the costs of CERs altogether.
As a result of these differences in regulations and methodologies, the costs of GHG benefits in
LULUCF projects range from USD 0.1 to 28 per t C. Most estimates lie in the range of USD I to
15 (IPCC, 20(X)). Table 5.1. represent the costs of LULUCF projects implemented under the AIJ
scheme (IPCC, 2001). It is clear that agroforestry offers a relatively cheap option (USD 0.2 to 10
per t C) among the various possibilities of sequestering carbon. However, caution should be
taken, hearing in mind the foregoing comments.
In order to justify the concerns of those who predict that plantations would come at the expense
of clean technology, it is necessary to compare these costs with those of regular COM projects.
Some of the difficulties surrounding LULUCF activities also concern the calculation of costs and
consequently the cost price of CERs for regular C DM projects in the fields of energy efficiency
and renewables. Still, these are not as controversial as costs of LULUCF activities. In an analysis
of AIJ projects, ECN (1999) has calculated that 99 percent of Annex I countries' abatement can
be realized below USD (1990) 10 per t C, when utilizing CDM in the energy sector. However,
other researchers come lo different conclusions. Stuart and Moura-Costa (1998) estimate the
average costs of fuel-switch projects to be as high as USD 25 per t C.
Table 5.1 : Undiscounted cost and carbon mitigation over project lifetime of selected A1J





































The uncertain conditions surrounding both the cost estimation for regular as well as LULUCF
activities, makes it impossible to predict with certainty if plantations would be the most popular
means of implementing the COM, crowding out clean technology transfer options. Obviously,
this risk is clearly present, however even if technology transfer would have a competitive edge at
the moment, this advantage will diminish because incremental costs will rise over time (ECN,
1999). This implies that it is just a matter of time before plantations under CDM become
economically viable. Hence, it remains necessary to look at the positive as well as the negative
implications that including plantations in CDM would have. This will be done in the following
section.
5.3. Plantations versus sustainable development.
One of the primary objectives of CDM is lto assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving
sustainable development ...'. This has to be taken into account when considering the question of
including LULUCF activities in CDM. In this section, the effects of LULUCF activities on
sustainable development prospects of non-Annex I countries will he dealt with. Obviously, this is
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not the place for a discussion about the definition of the concept of sustainable development. The
main focus will therefore be on development, although sustainability will not be kept out of the
discussion entirely.
As mentioned by Austin et al. (1999), the development effects of the COM have been
underrepresented in the body of research that has developed around CDM. Most of the existing
research has been based on case studies. This means there are still many controversial issues
related to this question.
Proponents of including plantations under CDM for reasons of economic development, rarely
take opportunity costs into consideration. The focus is on the revenues generated by stimulating
plantations. First of all, CDM plantations can provide new sources of income in the receiving
countries. They generate employment opportunities and might enhance the standard of living for
the local population. Secondly, it is expected [hat learning curve effects will arise as a result of
the build-up of plantations. In the field of land management or the development of institutions
lhat work lo address local needs, large improvements can be realized. Several case studies
support these arguments (www.cifor.org/news/carbon2.htm). Thirdly, plantations have positive
spill-over effects for those that do not profit directly from them. The local service base could be
strengthened and the infrastructure could be improved.
Finally, proponents argue that plantations as well as other forms of land use will improve the
productivity of land. The soil quality of heavily degraded land, may be enhanced as financial
flows accrue as a result of CDM. This is all the more important, since ODA flows are decreasing.
CDM could function as a substitute in this respect (Van Bodegom et al., 2000).
It may be clear lhat plantations lead to economic development in a certain manner. However, as
Evans (1986) notes, any kind of development that does not respond to the needs of the local
population ultimately fails. This is the primary argument of many NGOs from different
backgrounds, to oppose CDM plantations. Two groups of people that are likely to be affected
directly as a result of plantation activities. First, Ihe indigenous peoples might be displaced from
Ihe land to which they claim ancient ownership and which they value on a cultural and spiritual
level, in addition to its economic value. Especially with the problem of leakage in mind, this
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becomes a realistic oplion. Secondly, rural dwellers who conduct farming activities on heavily
degraded lands may be displaced. The increased pressure on available land may lead to
crowding-out of other land-use and forestry activities than sinks (pers.comm. G. Huppes, 2001).
Inequity in land ownership could be enlarged in this way. This may lead to food shortages in the
long term. There are more social effects of developing regions on the basis of forestry. For
example, the composition of the population may change dramatically, as the plantations will
attract migrants looking for employment. This could lead to ethnic or cultural disruption.
On a different scale, other potential threats enter into the discussion. These have to do with the
opportunity costs of COM plantations. As said, plantations may replace the introduction of clean
technology in non-Annex I countries. With many of these economies growing at a high pace,
emissions will be on the rise as well. This means the demand for clean technologies would grow
as well and it might then appear to have been a missed opportunity, in retrospect, that these
technologies would not have been transferred already under COM. Developing countries would
have sold the cheap opportunity to sequester carbon in plantations to developed countries and
would subsequently have to buy the clean technology from developed countries at market prices
(Gupta & Bhandari, 200Ü). Especially for those countries that will reach a certain level of
economic development which compels them to comply to abatement targets, this is a point worth
considering.
Finally, the introduction of large-scale plantations might lead to what is called a technological,
institutional and economic lock-in effect. This means that the institutional structure and the
allocation of available resources, would prevent countries to adjust to changing (economic and
social) situations.
5.4 Plantations versus preservation.
This section deals with the matter of preventing deforestation. It tries to compare the impact of
preservation with the impact of plantations. First, the potential benefits of preventing
deforestation will be touched upon. After that, the focus turns to the possible positive and
negative effects of plantations in non-Annex I countries.
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On a global scale, deforestation is one of the most important contributors in terms of carbon
emissions. IPCC (2000) estimates that it is currently responsible for approximately 25 percent of
the total emission. Emissions vary between different kinds of forest. Estimated averages vary
from 400 t/C per ha per year in boreal forests, 150 l/C per ha per year in temperate forests, and
250 t/C per ha per year in tropical forests. In this case aboveground as well as below-ground
carbon stocks are included in the calculation. If only aboveground carbon stock would be
included, this would enlarge the emissions of tropical forests relative to the other types of forests
(Ipcc, 2000).
It is clear that the potential benefits of preventing deforestation to take place are substantial in
terms of emission reduction (Noble and Scholes, 2001). Besides the positive effects in this
respect, preservation has other, non-carbon related, benefits. Preserving biodiversity, combating
desertification and the socio-cultural functions of forests are some of the issues in case. These
have been dealt with in Chapter 2, and will not be further elaborated upon now.
Forest plantations are inferior to existing old-growth forests on many accounts. They contain far
less biodiversity. They do not contribute to the maintenance of indigenous cultures, nor to the
survival of the poor. Inclusion of plantations in COM, combined with an exclusion of the
protection of existing forests in COM (e.g. because of additionality or other technical problems)
would give plantations a perverse advantage over forest protection, which will draw away
attention and funding from the rainforest and hence result in diffuse and adverse effects on
biodiversity, indigenous people and the poor. Thus, CDM would de facto work against Article
3.14 which provide that 'each party shall strive to implement commitments mentioned in
paragraph 3.1 in such a way as to minimize adverse social, environmental and economic impacts
on developing country Parties,.,.'. Moreover, the effect of inclusion of plantations under CDM
may seriously violate other Conventions, such as CBD and CCD This possibility is ruled out by
Article 2.l.a.ii of the Kyoto Protocol, which says that countries can only implement policies
directed towards the reduction of GHOs or enhancement by sinks 'taking into account its
commitments under relevant international environmental agreements;'
CDM could be an incentive to destroy existing tropical forest, to clear the way for plantations.
Thus, under the current set of regulations, a country's elite could first reap the benefits of cutting
and selling the natural riches, and subsequently make profits again by turning the deforested land
into a COM plantation. This would not be beneficial to the mitigation of OHO emissions, nor to
the sustainable development of these developing countries. It is hard to imagine that normal
principles of accountability, transparency, third-party monitoring, etc. may counterbalance the
strength of these perverse incentives.
It may be clear that plantations for carbon storage are not an appropriate way to mitigate GHG
emissions and to promote sustainable development. Indeed, many of the effects contradict the
regulations of the Kyoto Protocol itself. In the next chapter, two alternatives are proposed. The
first is directed towards the use of plantations. In this view, they serve as a source of renewable
energy instead of a carbon storage facility. The second alternative addresses existing forests. A
global forest facility is proposed in order to finance the safeguarding of existing forests.
6 A SOLUTION FOR PLANTATIONS: NOT AS SINKS,
BUT AS RENEWABLE ENERGY IN COM
As has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters, inclusion of forestry activities in COM, in
particular plantations as conceptualized up till now, has several serious drawbacks. In this chapter
an alternative option of the use of plantations in order to mitigate GHG emissions is presented.
This solution has been briefly touched upon in Chapter 3. The key of this option is to view
plantations under CDM not as a carbon storage facility, but as a source of renewable energy
instead, derived from the burning of the wood in solid, liquid or gasified form. As stated in
section 3.2, renewable (bio-fuel, biomass) energy is accepted in the Kyoto Protocol for use within
the Annex I countries. Furthermore, forestry is accepted in the protocol's Article 12 on CDM. A
combination of these two, i.e. to bring forest biomass energy under CDM, has as yet hardly been
conceptualised. Fossil fuel substitution is meanstream thinking in CDM but as yet associated only
with industrial-type projects, such as transition from coal to gas combustion. What we will
propose in this chapter is to bring forestry in CDM under the mainstream 'fossil fuel substitution
umbrella', in lieu of under the problematic 'sink' conceptualisation.
To our knowledge, Schlamadingcr et al. (2001) are the first authors that have connected biomass
energy production and CDM. They propose to "credit sinks primarily or exclusively in
association with bioenergy projects under the CDM", inspired by a proposal of P. Read that
"sink projects should carry a concomitant biofuel obligation ". These authors have not fully taken
leave of the sink concept for the implementation of projects under CDM. Acknowledging that
possibly, this may have reasons that we cannot fathom here, what we propose in the present
chapter is one step further and essentially much simpler. We propose not to credit sinks under a
biofuel condition, but to credit biofuel.
Section 6.1 elaborates on the principle of biomass energy, identifying opportunities and threats
that come with it. Section 6.2 presents a mechanism for including biomass plantations in the
CDM. The following section 6.3 then compares the effects of biomass plantations and sinks.
Finally, section 6.4 focuses compatibility of bioenergy plantations with the Kyoto Protocol.
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6.1 Biomass as a renewable source of energy
Biomass is used as a term for all organic matter of plants, trees and crops. It has been recognized
as a source of renewable energy by institutions such as IPCC, the World Energy Council and
Shell (Faaij, 1997). If burned or slowly decomposed, the carbon dioxide emissions from biomass
are almost entirely equal to what has been taken out of the atmosphere and stored in the plant
tissue, thus resulting in the production of energy with a net GHG emission close to zero. The
slight discrepancy between the uptake and the emission of CO2 results from the need to use a
limited amount of energy to produce biomass in the first place (Cushman et ai, 1995). However,
this is analogous to the production of other sources of sustainable energy such as wind or solar
energy. Therefore, bioenergy is a substitute for fossil sources of energy in much the same way as
other forms of durables.
Recent technological developments in the field of conversion technology have increased the
applicability and efficiency of bioenergy, thereby increasing its competitiveness vis-à-vis other
energy sources (Faaij, 1997). Besides burning biomass directly, it may be converted into solid,
gaseous and liquid fuels (Hall and House, 2001). This creates the opportunity to apply bioenergy
in existing technologies, hence limiting the implementation costs and increasing the acceptance in
the energy sector.
The introduction and demand for biomass energy will largely depend on its competitive edge.
Biomass energy will have to compete in various markets. On the one hand, for output is has to
become a player in the energy market, for which the price is momentarily set by oil. On the other
hand, biomass energy will have to compete on input markets. The most important is the timber
market. The price on this market is the result of demand for limber from the construction sector,
the furniture sector, etc.; Sedjo and Sohgen (2001) have elaborated on the effects of biomass
energy on the timber market.
Prior to using biomass for the creation of energy, it can be used for other purposes thus
improving the energy-efficiency of the biomass. This process of 'cascading', which has been
highlighted in Chapter 3, is based on three broad principles: (1) carbon may be stored in wood
products, (2) biofuels may be used instead of fossil fuels and (3) fossil fuel-intensive materials
may be replaced for forest products and other bio-products. According to its possible functions,
the life cycle of biomass may be extended and serve different markets through time.
Obviously, using biomass as a source of energy, possibly in combination with cascading, is an
opportunity to mitigate GHG emissions. Still, (he feature of bioenergy arguably has wider socio-
economic implications than solar and wind energy. Moreover, it should be taken into
consideration that the desirability of bioenergy plantations ultimately depends on the local
circumstances (Hall and House, 2001).
According to Faaij (1997), 'if biomass is to make a substantial contribution to the world's energy
supply it will have to include not only biomass residues - such as from commercial forestry (e.g.
thinning) and agriculture (e.g. straw) - and organic wastes, but also energy crops'. Often these
energy crops are perceived to be fasl growing trees, such as willow or Eucalyptus. These
monocultures, though, might have an adverse impact on other and more localized environmental
parameters, as is highlighted for the case of eucalyptus in an article by Gaster (2000). Apart from
that, other environmental considerations should be borne in mind when addressing bioenergy
plantations.
Cushman et al. (1995) have looked at the most efficient way to reduce atmospheric carbon
dioxide. They found that while it is favourable to plant bioenergy plantations on land that can
support high growth rates, the net carbon balance on degraded lands with low productivity is best
when they are turned into carbon storage facilities. Furthermore Cushman et al. advise to leave
slow-growing old forests in place, since destroying them would only enlarge the level of
atmospheric carbon dioxide. It remains clear however, that plantations can form a significant
contribution to reduce net carbon emissions al a global scale.
Chapters 4 and 5 have given an overview of formal and non-formal problems connected to
carbon plantations. Many of these problems seem intrinsic to the plantation idea as such. This is
not the case, however. Rather these problems are intrinsic to treating plantations as a sink.
6.2 Bringing biomass plantations in CDM
6.2. 1 The core notion
The core notion of plantations as bio-energy under CDM is to disburse CERs-based funding to
plantation investors at the moment and to the degree that burning of fossil fuel is actually
avoided, that is, the moment the plantation wood is actually combusted in a combustion facility
that produces energy, taking into regards the efficiency rates of combusting.
The following sections will show to what extent the problem identified in the preceding chapters
are avoided this way. In section 6.2.2. to 6.2.4. the mechanism is explained in some more detaiJ.
6.2.2 Actors
Five types of actors play a key role in the proposed mechanism. They are put in CAPITALS here,
to underline their categorical character.
• First, INVESTOR is the entity owning the plantation in a non- Annex I country. INVESTOR
may be a multinational corporation or a local firm, but it may very well be a local community
or even a single farmer.
• Second, COUNTRY is any Annex I country that disburses to INVESTOR on the basis of the
expected CERs in the first or later commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol. COUNTRY
may be represented by a specialized agency in the non-Annex I country. It may reach small
investors, for instance, through a development NOO.
• Third, CDM is CDM in its identity as actor, e.g. its board or secretariat.
» Then, THIRD PARTY are institutions that play a vital role in verification or other services in
which an objective, truth-oriented function is required.
• Finally, BANK may be any banking agency geared towards financing of projects if
necessary; this may be a commercial bank, a 'green' bank, a development bank, a rural credit
scheme or a NGO's revolving fund, to mention just a few possibilities.
It may be noted that the wood-combusting energy plants are not part of the actors scheme here.
Of course, this does not imply they do not exist; in fact they are necessary for INVESTOR to
prove that the wood has actually prevented fossil fuel combustion. For that very reason, new
wood combusting energy plants may he pan of INVESTOR'S strategy or else might be so
lucrative as to stimulate other (specialized) companies to invest. It is not necessary to certify the
plant under COM. It is only necessary to verify its combustion efficiency, which should be
conducted by THIRD PARTY, connected to fossil fuel prevention and hence COUNTRY'S
disbursements.
Not certifying energy plants has the advantage that an important perverse incentive is avoided,
namely, a temptation for certified plants to burn other than certified biomass, e.g. non-additional
biomass or even wood from natural forests, and yet earning CERs. Even more importantly, it
avoids the need to certify the multitude of wood-combusting plants that exists already, of which
the firewood cooking ovens of local populations are possibly the most important. These family
fires prevent the use of fossil fuels just like high-tech combustion plants, albeit with low
efficiency. If certified plantation wood is used for this most basic process, COM will allow
disbursement based on the lowest-of-all efficiency. This implies that firewood plantations may
become economically viable under CDM even for poor communities and a small INVESTOR.
This would benefit, for instance, drylands suffering from land degradation and desertification,
such as the Sahel. Moreover, the INVESTOR will be stimulated to provide or at least to
encourage the use of ovens with higher efl'iciency levels, as it will yield more CERs.
Another actor that seems to be absent here, is the country in which the plantation is located. This
is not the case, however, the recipient country plays an important hut passive role by setting the
juridical boundaries for operating the investment.
6.2.3 Operating the mechanism
Between these actors, the proposed mechanisms works as follows.
At the request of INVESTOR, THIRD PARTY is put to work for the certification of a (planned)
plantation at a specific place. Sustainably managed secondary forest might be eligible for
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certification as well, as long as it complies with the certification criteria. This may well be to the
advantage of local communities. Certification criteria are based on the following guidelines:
• Additionally, the non-viability of the plantation investment without the prospect of CERs,
• No harm for biodiversity: this criterion, connected to CBD, clearly prevents that existing
valuable tropical forest is converted into plantations through COM.
• No harm for indigenous peoples. CBD and the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples prevent that sites if value for indigenous cultures are turned into
plantations under CDM.
• No harm for heal population. This criterion prevents that an area used for local livelihoods is
turned into a plantation of less such value. Evictions, of course, are excluded as well.
• Finally, a plantation should be in accordance with (national) government policies and the
country's juridical framework (e.g. land zoning) and general principles of law (e.g. against
land grabbing).
As a result of large differences in local socio-economic and environmental conditions, it is not
desirable to develop a blue-print for measurement and certification of plantations. Eventually, the
certification procedure has to be carried out using more specific criteria which are derived from
the guidelines of existing conventions. It may be noted that already in the very simple form
specified above, the criteria exclude the certification of "nightmare plantations" (i.e. plantations
replacing virgin forest, evicting local people, etc.). Moreover, local communities and to a certain
extent private owners that decide to turn part of their land into a plantation will be able to have
their sites certified with ease. This is contrary to large (corporate) investors who do not yet own
or rent the land. Such investors may of course enter into contracts with communities and
individuals who do.
What is the effect of the certification? Certification implies that CDM vows that COUNTRY
earns CERs, which can be used in the commitment period, at the time and to the extent that
biomass from the certified plantation has actually been used to substitute fossil fuel
combustion. For COUNTRY, these CERs have a monetary value and it is this monetary
value that COUNTRY can use to pay INVESTOR (again at the time of actual fossil fuel
substitution). Thus, COUNTRY and INVESTOR enter into a contract of that effect, either
directly or through representation. This contract may be negotiated on an ad hue basis, or
standardized to the effect that COUNTRY announces its general intention to pay a certain
amount per kg of avoided carbon from certified plantations. With the contract, INVESTOR
may go to BANK to negotiate a loan, if necessary.
THIRD PARTY will verify the plant's combustion efficiency and social policy with fixed time
intervals, always allowing the baseline "household cooking oven efficiency" in the absence of a
technologically more advanced combustion plant. THIRD PARTY will encounter more
difficulties when verifying the degree to which the plantation's wood is actually used to prevent
fossil fuel use. There is a perverse incentive for INVESTOR to bring all the wood of the
plantation under this heading, meanwhile selling it for other purposes, such as furniture
production or construction. Selling the biomass for divergent purposes is not illegal in the CDM
plantation mechanism; INVESTOR has not promised to use the plantation for bioenergy and
consequently, the plantation's certification only implies that disbursements will take place when
and if fossil fuel prevention has occurred. But selling the biomass on a non-fuel market and at the
same time claiming disbursement under CDM is illegal, naturally, and the prevention of this
action is a major task for THIRD PARTY.
As said, INVESTOR may call in BANK to finance its investment. This does not differ from any
other investment. In developing countries, however, many investments are done directly by local
capitalists or local communities, used as they are to imperfect capital markets Local communities
may be assisted by NGOs, green banks, etc.
In this stage of implementing the instruments of the Kyoto Protocol the discourse above is one of
the possible ways of structuring CDM investments. The creation and maturing of IET may alter
this practice altogether. CERs themselves could become the prime incentive for investment. The
investor could then sell the CERs on the market, without any interference from Annex I
countries. The price for CERs will be determined by simple demand and supply, instead of
mutual agreement.
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6.2.4 The development bonus
Avoiding negative social and environmental consequences of plantation establishment as
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, has been included in the certification procedure. This certification
should be a sufficient basis for disbursements under CDM. Plantations may have additional
development benefits as well. For instance, INVESTOR may allow local people to hunt, gather
fruits, graze cattle, carry out bee-keeping and so on, or allow farming between young trees after
clear cutting on the part of the plantation, thus stimulating a sustainable shifting cultivation on the
improved plantation soil. Plantations may bring many more benefits lo the local population and
the environment, like watershed regulation and the prevention of wind erosion.
Realization of the additional social and environmental benefits brings about extra costs for
INVESTOR. As a result, there is no incentive for INVESTOR to invest in these social benefits
any more than is compulsory under the certification criteria. For that reason, an additional
'development bonus' might be considered lo stimulate INVESTOR.
It should be borne in mind that such a development bonus is not a primary responsibility of
CDM, because the stimulated activities do not have a direct impact on the reduction of
atmospheric carbon. The CDM plantation mechanism, once established, could be used by
development-oriented institutions, however, for doing efficient development work. Thus, a
'development bonus', financed through non-CDM sources but disbursed through the structure
established under CDM, could be allowed to be added to the normal CDM based disbursements
of COUNTRY.
The 'development bonus' should not be disbursed at the start of a project, because that would
amount to input funding (i.e. paying for promises). Rather, THIRD PARTY could assess the
compliance to the additional development bonus conditions, such that these are added to the
disbursement routine.
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6.3 Solutions and remaining problems
6.3.1. Solutions to formal problems
One of the problems connected to plantations as carbon storage facilities is permanence. This
relates to the fact that sequestered carbon can be released back into the air, by forest fires or
processes of natural decay. This problem is not mitigated, but intrinsically resolved if plantations
are treated as a source of bioenergy with disbursements connected to the time and degree of
actual substitution of fossil fuel.
It may be noted too that this way, forestry projects now have a conceptual structure equal to any
other project of technology improvement in COM. Whether dealing with a switch from coals to
natural gas, or solar energy projects or forestry (or any other biomass project, for that matter),
CDM will be an mechanism with a unified conceptual structure.
Treating plantations as a source of energy will make the plantations normal economic investment
projects. This ensures the owner and/or project developer will be motivated to protect the
investment in order to maximize returns on investment. Forest thinning, for instance, instead of
presenting a difficult monitoring problem of a sink, will just be an early benefit to the owner; he
burns some early wood, and receives some early disbursements.
Experiences with biomass plantations have shown that the long duration of the pay-back period
poses a risk that many potential investors are not willing to take. This often has a negative impact
on the competitiveness of investments in biomass plantations. This may result in investments in
different types of land-use instead. In order to avoid this problem, bridging loans should be given
through green banking, the GEF and international banking corporations such as World Bank.
As a result of unifying the structures for biomass energy plantations along the line of regular
CDM projects, the liability question which is connected to the issue of permanence (who bears
the brunt if a plantation burns?), is solved as well.
Having thus solved the permanence problem, which is indeed unique to forests under CDM,
plantations continue to have, 'baseline', 'additionality' and 'leakage' problems just like any other
CDM project type.
Baseline calculation is now completely similar to other CDM projects. The point of departure
here is a business-as-usual scenario whereby fossil fuels are used to generate energy. The
difference between the consequent level of GHG emissions and the level of emissions generated
by biomass energy, will form the basis of CER calculations (see fig. 6.1). This intrinsically solves
the problem of having to make assumptions about future allocation of the land on which the
plantation is settled, as is the case with establishing sinks.
Figure 6.1 : The calculation method of prevented GHG emissions under CDM.
The problem of additionally is more difficult to solve, though it does not pose additional
problems compared to other CDM projects. An ex ante assessment is needed to determine if a
biomass plantation project would not be economically viable without the support of CDM. If this
is the case, the plantation can be certified under CDM according to the Kyoto Protocol. 2 This
naturally includes multi-purpose plantations, burning of residual agrarian waste and so on. See
Sugiyama and Michaelowa for a general discussion of baseline problems in CDM.
2 In fact, any project activity is eligible under CDM, as long as it has been proven ex ante that il would not have
taken place in the absence of the Protocol.
The only remaining formal problem is that of leakage which, as discussed in Chapter 5, has two
components: leakage through effects on markets and leakage through activity shifting. Market
leakage occurs if plantations have a substantial price effect on energy, due to increased supply of
energy. Part of the gains through fossil fuel substitution would then be lost because of reduced
incentives for energy saving, etc. This is no different from other JI and COM projects, however.
If it is accepted there, then it should also be accepted for plantations.
As for shifting of activities, the situation stays the same. By allocating land for plantations,
people who use this land as source of income will be displaced. This is potentially harmful to
(tropical) forests. Since there is no natural incentive to offset the costs of preventing these social
en subsequent environmental problems, an incentive should be created within the CDM
framework. This incentive could take the form of a financial bonus, as menstioned in section
6.2.4.
As discussed in Chapter 4, a final set of formal problems connected to plantations as sinks under
CDM, concern verification and monitoring. It may be obvious that most of these problems have
evaporated along with the surmounting of the permanence, baseline and additionally problems.
Under the output financing regime, only technical verifications remain. The first is the ex. ante
test regarding the viability of projects without CDM; this is a matter of ordinary cost-benefit
analysis. The second verification concerns the actual amount of avoided GHGs emission, in order
to calculate the amount of CERs; plant combustion efficiency is a key factor here. This
measurement comes down to a single assessment of GHG emission, thereby taking into account a
possible difference between combustion efficiency of wood versus the avoided fossil fuel. Of
course this verification should be carried or by an objective third party.
6.3.2 Solutions to non-formal problems
Chapter 5 has identified a number of other, non-formal drawbacks of carbon storage in sinks.
These are (1) carbon stored in sinks may be seen as less 'real' emission reduction than actual
reductions; (2) in a later stage of development, non-Annex I countries may find that they are
forced to buy expensive technology; (3) countries may become locked-in to a static plantation
economy which they cannot restructure due to the incurred sink obligations, and (4) plantations
as sinks under COM while excluding the protection of existing forest from COM may result in
perverse incentives, detrimental to biodiversity, cultural diversity, socially marginalized groups
and the climate itself.
Below, these problems are revisited, under the assumption that plantations function as input for
biomass, which is capitalized on after this has been transformed into energy ('output financing').
Since establishing biomass plantations is an approach, which can be adjusted and reversed in the
course of time, several problems can be solved to a large extent.
(Ad 1) The first problem has been solved. Avoided emissions are just as real as those from other
carbon neutral energy sources, such as wind energy, hydroenergy, etc.
(Ad 2) In an output financing regime, non-Annex I countries (or the forestry investors in them)
have not fixed their plantations for biomass fuel use under CDM. They only have certified
plantations, meaning that if the biomass is actually transformed into energy, Annex I countries
will credit through CDM. If they decide for an other use of the wood or to convert the plantation
into something else altogether, they do not violate any promise but only forego the CDM
crediting. Also, if a country develops to the level it has to attain QELRCs for its own, these may
be more easily realized as a result of having an economy based on biomass energy. The country
may then use the biomass for its own carbon obligations.
(Ad 3) The same reasoning holds, with a broader application, for the lock-in effect. Certification
and benefits under CDM do not oblige an investor or a country to keep these plantations
eternally. They can be used for any purpose deemed necessary, or converted. Usually this
decision will be taken by market parties that own the plantations instead of governments.
(Ad 4) Some problems of perverse incentives eventually remain, especially when the protection
of existing forests is not guaranteed. Still, these can be largely offset by CDM regulations. The
social costs connected to avoiding these incentives to occur can be partly covered in the
investment, enhanced by the possibility of gaining financial support from CDM if this would
make a project economically unviable.
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Finally, it may be remarked that the simple system of ex ante certification and disbursements at
the actual moment of fuel substitution works not only for large commercial plantations. Also
communities may participate, especially if helped by NGOs and possibly a new GEF window on
land degradation. Natural regrowth on degraded land is essentially certifiable as well.
6.3.3 Remaining problems
As far as can be overseen at present, no conceptual or practical problem is now left unaddressed.
Some, such as permanence, have been resolved intrinsically. Others are reduced to proportions
normal to regular CDM and Jl projects. Finally, there are problems which have to be included in
a distinct certification procedure, which is carried out and subsequently verified by a objective
third parly, that may be selected on a basis of scientific and economic capabilities and
incorruptibility. Probably the greatest struggle for the third party will be the verification of the
end use of the plantations biomass. This stems from the temptation that any investor is subject to,
which is to bring all the biomass under the fossil fuel prevention umbrella, while actually selling
it for other purposes. This temptation will always exist.
6.4 Should sinks be entirely excluded from CDM?
With the implementation of plantations in CDM as sources of alternative energy, the question
may arise if plantations that are not able to serve energy substitution purposes should be left out
of CDM altogelher. These forest, after all, will still act as sinks during their growing stage. As
Cushman et al. (1995) have indicated, such forests may indeed exist, since it is not feasible
everywhere to operate new forests as energy plantations. This is especially true on sites of high
vulnerability with regards to soil erosion and exhaustion of nutrients. In certain sites of very steep
slopes, poor soils and risks of desertification, for instance, all attention should be on establishing
and keeping the forest as such, without objectives or great possibilities for energy production.
(This may also hold for non-forest ecosystems such as large wetlands, for instance those where
water management is changed such that the build-up of peat or other organic storage is enhanced,
without envisaging to use the peat as biomass fuel.)
55
Exclusion of such forests (or other ecosystems) from COM appears to be risking to forego a good
opportunity to stimulate climate problem prevention. If they would be included under COM one
way or another, however, they should comply with the criteria of Article 12 with the same
stringency as do the forests-for-energy. In view of the analyis of the first chapters of the present
report, these forests-as-sinks will not be able to meet these CDM criteria on a routine-like basis
as do the forests-for-energy.
Allowance of forests-as-sinks, if any, should therefore be considered only on an ad hoc basis,
connected to clear-cut evidence on permanence, baseline, social acceptability, biodiversity
arguments and additionally, focusing on large tracts of land on which forest is the most rational
use. Additionality here includes the non-viability of using the land for energy purposes (i.e. the
normal CDM routine). Thus, non-Annex I countries could be allowed to each bring forward a
small number of such sinks-to-be for inclusion under CDM. (China, for instance, may be
expected then to bring forward its large-scale anti-desertfication forest plans.) CDM's (co-
financing decision may then be established in a process of ad hoc negotiation focusing on these
specific cases. We then follow the recommendation of Sugiyama and Michaelowa (2001) who,
although focusing on the additionality criterion only rather than on the whole CDM set, make a
plea for the allowance of ad hoc negotiations under CDM.
After the net uptake of carbon of these plantations has ceased to exist, they may be regarded as
existing forest as any other and worthy of protection for that reason (but outside CDM).
The protection of existing forests from the climate point of view is not accommodated for yet.
Indeed, without formulating and implementing policies with respect to existing forest, the
introduction of large-scale biomass energy could even work counterproductive for the global
climate. Therefore, Chapter 7 is dedicated to addressing the problem of the current loss of
existing forests in non- Annex I countries.
A SOLUTION FOR EXISTING FORESTS:
AN OUTPUT-BASED GLOBAL FOREST FACILITY
In Chapter 5, it has been concluded that very serious problems surround the inclusion of forests
in COM. The previous chapter has focussed on plantations and indicated lhat for this forest type,
the structure and basis of inclusion of CDM has to be reconceptualized. The outcome of this
reconceptualization has been to treat plantations as producers of fossil fuel combustion
prevention, similarly to regular CDM projects. In this chapter, a solution is sought for the existing
forests in non-Annex I countries. It builds on the principle of 'paying for functions', which has
been elaborated on in Chapter 3.
7.1 A 'multi-convention' global facility
As said in Chapter 2, the forests in non-Annex I countries are a large carbon pool; deforestation
therefore influences the global climate. In view of the current rate of tropical forest Joss,
preventing this carbon pool from becoming a source of GHGs is of obvious relevance for the
global climate. This cannot lead to a solution analogous to that of plantations, however, since the
opportunity to derive benefits from energy production are absent. Moreover, the problems of
permanence, baseline and additionality cannot be solved by such a structure. Assessing a baseline
for forest protection would be based on highly uncertain and subjective assumptions. Another
undesirable effect of Irving to preserve existing forests in CDM results from the CDM
requirement of additionality. In order to prove that protection would not have taken place without
CDM, countries would be tempted to declassify protected forest areas, or at least not establish
any new protected areas; this is the "inborn paradox of the additionality concept", discussed by
Sugiyama and Michaelowa (2001). It may be concluded that the protection of existing forests in
non-Annex I countries cannot be brought into compliance with CDM requirements. Since CDM
is the only instrument in the Kyoto Protocol where non-Annex I countries are involved, the
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protection of these forests cannot find a significant place in the framework of the global climate
negotiations.
The first step towards a solution for tropical forests is the consideration that tropical forests are
multi-functional on a local, national and a global scale. The climate function is but one of these
functions, as has been reviewed in Chapter 2. In fact, forests are the prime area of synergy of the
conventions on biodiversity (CBD), climate (FCCC), land degradation (CCD), cultural heritage
(Paris Convention) and the UN draft decision on the rights of indigenous peoples supported by
the general Forest Declaration (UNCED).
Following this line of reasoning, the establishment of a global forest facility, geared towards the
protection of existing forests and structured to serve the objectives of all these conventions,
would be a logical step forward. The principle of paying for the various forest functions can be
regarded as the basis for operating the global forest facility. The facility could be incorporated,
for instance, in the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Although GEF is structured along the
lines of the separate global conventions, it could open a 'forest synergy' window. However, the
remainder of this chapter will explore an option that is differently structured and potentially more
substantial in hectare terms.
7.2 Output financing
In the previous chapter, key problems in the CDM-plantations nexus disappeared due to the
reconceptualization of the disbursement mechanism in the direction of output-financing. This will
also be the key of the present section.
In a regular economic buyer-supplier relationship, transactions are based on output financing.
The buyer thereby pays the supplier on the basis of the product or service thai is provided. A
supplier that lacks the necessary funds to initiate the production process may turn to investors,
e.g. banks or shareholders, in order to finance the production of the service or good that needs to
be provided. The buyer pays the supplier after the product or good has been supplied.
Subsequently, the supplier pays off the bank.
Current practices in global environmental policy are often different. They are based on input
financing. Here, investors pay the suppliers of a projected service in advance. Buyer and supplier
agree on an a bundle of plans and promises, and evaluate the extent to which these have been
realized in retrospect. Nevertheless, the idea of output financing is sometimes seen shimmering
through in global environmental policy. The following quote of the World Bank (1992) is
exemplary: 'The international community should transfer additional funds to developing
countries to achieve a level of spending that reflects the desire to protect species and habitats
there." The global climate and other conventions could be added to this biodiversity-oriented
'protection of species and habitats'. The same is visible in Tobey (1993} and many other authors
discussing the global efficiency of forest protection. At the same time, however, these authors as
well as institutions such as World Bank and GEF appear to be somehow stuck in the 'banking
paradigm' of input financing.
It seems to be worthwhile to explore the modalities of adding an output-financing component,
which in this case is a rather direct link between the global forest benefit consumers (mostly
countries in the North) on the one hand and the global forest benefit producers (largely countries
in the South) on the other. The focus will be on global benefits, since it is assumed that
international, national and sub-national economic benefits (logging, medicine, watershed
regulation, etc.) are taken care of through existing markets already (wood market, pharmaceutical
market, eco-tourism market, etc.).
7.3 Key modalities
Under normal market conditions, a buyer pays a supplier a certain amount of money, which is at
least equal to the discounted future benefits that are expected to be derived from the purchase.
The buyer pays the supplier at the moment of the delivery of the good or service, not at all future
moments that actual benefits arise. To put this buyer-supplier relationship in practical terms,
taking the purchase of a car can serve as an example. Someone buys and pays a car as soon as the
car dealer has delivered it. He does not pay the car dealer later, at every moment or in
accordance to the degrees that actual benefits are realized. The analogue for the global forest
facility would be:
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• not to pay for the separate efforts of the forest producing and protecting (i.e. supplying)
countries,
• not to pay for all separate global forest benefits at the moment they actually arise,
• but to pay for the physical present forest, i.e. for standing forest on a per-hectare-per-year
basis.
Using this mechanism, the global forest facility may function as a global clearing house that
structures disbursements. The facility receives financing from the net benefit receiving countries
and disburses to the net benefit producing countries, on the basis of simple rules, yet to be
proposed and agreed upon. Disbursements per hectare per year are congruent with the actual way
benefits of forests accrue. Moreover, by structuring disbursements in this way, the proper
incentive for forest protection is set; if protection fails or if the forest is willingly given up to
ranching or intensive logging or is converted otherwise, disbursements simply stop.
Disbursements take place on the basis of actual and measurable hectares of standing forest. In
order to distinguish between high and low quality forests, some quality criteria (e.g. in terms of
biodiversity and climate risk) have to be formulated and implemented. The criteria may be
assessed through remote sensing and automated data processing. Crown cover and road density
are likely to be sufficient to largely fulfill this role, connected to the geographic location of the
forest. This way, maintaining a very low logging rate and other non-destructive types of forest
use remain possible. Disbursements will follow the automated remote sensing assessment, hence
overhead (transaction) costs of the facility will be low.
This method of assessment does not include the conservation of cultural diversity and the rights
of indigenous peoples in forests. Forests could get an 'indigenous peoples bonus' if a government
can prove, for instance, that the forest is used by indigenous people.
Disbursements may take place from governments of net benefit receiving countries to
governments of net benefit producing countries through the facility, After all, it is governments
who have committed themselves to the aim of forest protection through the forest-related
conventions, which have been summarized earlier in this Chapter 2. Severe human rights
violations and suchlike could be justified as ground for exclusion from the facility, as is
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customary in international affairs. Naturally in order to maintain their level of benefits from the
global facility, countries will be inclined to use the benefits for forest protection. The precise
distribution of the disbursements from the national to the sectoral and local levels should be left
to domestic political processes in the receiving countries, however. Involvement in domestic
distribution mechanisms is not a practical necessity (nor a primary moral obligation) of the
facility.
Output funding will largely resolve the sovereignly problems that are associated with input
funding. This is in line with the desire of many developing countries, that global solutions to
lower the emissions of GHGs will not undermine their sovereignty. In structures of input funding
of forest protection, one example of which are debt-fortune swaps, a country promises to protect
a certain area of forest for ever. In a general sense, the country gives up its sovereignly over this
forest and this piece of land. In the long run, nations "do not accept being transformed into a
doorman of a zoo of the Americans", as a Brazilian once put it (Büttel, 1990). This problem is
one of the reasons why debt-for nature swaps never gained much ground. In a structure of output
funding, i.e. disbursements on the basis of actual standing forest, a country is not obliged to
promise anything, let alone for ever.
A final general point to note with respect to disbursements on a per hectare per year basis, is that
countries with much forest will receive much, merely as a matter of luck. This seems to
contradict to principles of common meritocratic morality. At the same time, however,
meritocratic morality is not the morality of all domains of daily life or of international relations.
The diamonds of Botswana, the oil of the USA, natural gas of the Netherlands or the geographic
position of Singapore - all of these are just a matter of luck, which is accepted at the same time.
There is no need to make an exception for the natural resources of foresled countries.
7.4 Financing the global forest facility
In this section the inflow requirements of the global forest facility will be briefly explored, based
on De Groet and Kamminga (1995). Several principles of financing are presented here:
• The first is the logic of benefits. Countries finance the facility to the degree they have benefits
from the halting of deforestation. This is common economic logic, visible in the quotation
from the World Bank (1992), Tobey (1993) and many others. Roughly, this principle might
be operationalized by GNP. Countries with a large economy then contribute more than
countries with a relatively small economy.
• A second principle is causation. Countries contribute to the facility to the degree they have
contributed to the forest problem, i.e. the degree to which they have deforested their formerly
forested area. In general, the principle of causation is common in international politics
• A third principle is taxbearing capacity, or global equity. Roughly, this principle might be
operationalized by GNP per capita.
Practical ethics and international negotiations will have to decide upon the final form that facility
financing will get. In order to arrive at a first estimate of what countries would have to contribute
under various financing regimes. De Groot & Kamminga (1995) elaborate a 'mixed compromise'
formula.
The rules mentioned above are distributive, hence do not touch upon the total amount that would
be needed for the facility to work. The key figure in this respect is the level of disbursements per
hectare per year that would be needed to make a real difference for the global forest. Explorations
by De Groot & Kamminga (1995) indicate that an average disbursement of US$ 15 per hectare
per year, although not offsetting alternative revenues of deforestation in some cases (e.g. mining),
will make this difference. Taking into account the area of existing tropical forest, the yearly
throughput of the facility would then be approximately US$ 15 billion a year. This figure may be
compared with the estimates of Tobey (1993), of US$ 150 billion a year for global CO2 emission
stabilization, or with the US$ 40 billion per year for Official Development Aid, the US$ 100
billion per year of debt servicing by developing countries, the throughput of the world timber
market of US$ 5 billion a year, or the World Bank lending to the LDCs of US$ 10 billion per
year (all figures from around 1990, found in De Groot & Kamminga, 1995). In sum, mounting a
facility of a US$ 15 billion magnitude does not seem impossible. Countries or groups of countries
could start the facility on a bilateral and modest scale, e.g. by twinning countries in the North and
South. Such a schedule is in discussion already with respect to the climate adaptation fund.
8
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This report aims lo clarify the following questions:
1. May the inclusion of tropical (non-Annex I countries') forests in COM, conceptualised as
carbon sinks, comply with the COM criteria ( Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol)?
2. What are the positive and negative external effects of plantations as carbon sinks?
3. Which alternative ways of implementing forestry in the climate policy can be found with
regards to the forest of non-Annex I countries (i.e. in CDM)?
These questions will be answered briefly in this chapter. Subsequently, some recommendations
for future research will be presented.
S.I Conclusions
May the inclusion of tropical (non-Annex I countries ' ) forests in CDM, conceptualised as carbon
sinks, comply with the CDM criteria ( Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol)?
Article 12 of the Protocol sets the criteria that any CDM project should meet. These criteria
comprise the following: emission reductions should be real, measurable and yield long-term
benefits related to the mitigation of climate change, additional to any that would occur in the
absence of certified project activity and characterized by transparency of reporting,
accountability, efficiency and verifiability of results.
Plantations as carbon storage facilities can not live up to all of the above criteria
• Leakage of achieved emission reductions undermines the criteria that reductions should be
real.
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• The issue of permanence, which is unique lo sinks, refers to the fact that there is no guarantee
thai carbon is stored on the long term. This carbon can be released as a result of natural or
anthropogenic influences.
• The baseline issue is of a different origin in the case of sinks, than in that of COM projects
directed to the prevention of emissions. For the latter group, the baseline is the GHG emission
under a business-as-usual scenario using fossil fuels. The former requires a baseline, whereby
calculations have to be made in order lo determine the amount of sequestered carbon if the
sink project would not have taken place. This requires an extensive set of assumptions on
future developments. This reflects negatively on the measurabilily of the achieved reductions.
• The problem of additionality is connected to the issue of baseline. Measuring this criterion
requires a broad set of assumptions as well.
It is concluded that the sink concept should not be the key to implement forestry in COM. As said
in Chapter 6, some exceptions may be considered on a site-specific basis, lo be proposed by non-
Annex I parties, especially with respect lo large sinks that are beneficial also for other purposes
(such as the combat of desertification).
What are the positive and negative external effects of plantations as carbon storage facilities ?
When reviewing the costs and benefits of plantations as carbon storage facilities for non-Annex I
counlries, opportunity costs are often disregarded, resulting in a positive assessment of these
facilities. This report pays some more attention to this fact and comes to the overall conclusion
thai including sinks may not be desirable under most circumslances.
Sinks may have the following positive external effects:
• On a local scale plantations can provide new sources of income.
• Local knowledge concerning forestry and land management may increase.
• The establishment of plantations can strengthen the local service base, improve local
infrastructure, etc.
Sinks may have negative external effects as well:
• Indigenous people and rural dwellers may be displaced from Iheir land.
• The poor may be affected if their source of livelihood is changed into a plantation.
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• Large investment may induce social, racial or cultural disruption.
On a different scale, the negative effects are:
• Crediting plantations might be an incentive to replace existing forests for plantations.
• The crowding out effect vis-a-vis clean technology transfer.
• Non-Annex I countries may sell cheap solutions of GHG mitigation to Annex I countries, and
consequently have to buy expensive clean technology in the future.
• Countries may be caught in an institutional, technological and economic lock-in effect.
8.2 Solutions
Which alternative ways of implementing forestry in the climate policy can be found with regards
to non-Annex f countries (i.e. in COM)?
The overall assessment of including plantations as carbon storage facilities is negative.
Nevertheless, tropical forestry remains crucial in mitigating climate change. This is
acknowledged by this report by formulating two alternative principles for including the tropical
forest in climate policy. These options alleviate most of the problems surrounding plantations as
carbon storage.
First, plantations may be included as producers of (energy) resources that prevent the use of fossil
fuels. On the basis of Article 12 (COM) and the above considerations, a set of guidelines has
been formulated Ihat these plantations have to comply with, such as no-harm criteria that may be
used in the certification of plantations-to-be. In the operational framework, disbursements take
place if and when trees from certified areas actually prevent the use of fossil fuel, i.e. the time of
combustion in any type of energy-producing technology.
Second, existing forests in non-Annex I countries may be conserved through a 'multi-convention'
global facility. This recognizes the multi-functionalily of forests. The facility is based on the
straightforward principle that net forest benefit consuming countries disburse to net forest benefit
producing countries on the basis of standing forest per hectare per year. Only global functions
which are not economically valued in existing markets, such as the biodiversity and carbon
storage functions, should be accounted for under this regime.
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8.3 Recommendations for further research
This report explored problems and solutions surrounding forestry in CDM. Although an
extensive body of literature is currently evolving around this issue, certain aspects remain
underrepresented.
The body of research around the economic feasibility of tropical bio-energy in all its forms is
something that has gained attention only recently. Most research in this respect is carried out on a
national level, while the two main determinants of feasibility are the limber and energy markets.
These markets operate on a global level to a great extent, however. Besides this economic
feasibility, there is a lack of scientific literature on the social acceptability and the multi-
functional design of large scale (biomass) plantations.3
Depending on the reception of the ideas developed in the present report, further research is
needed on the design, consequences, start-up and acceptability of plantations as sources of energy
under CDM and global forest financing. One issue with respect to the latter may be, for instance,
how such financing might be 'flexibilized'.
3 In 2000, a research project has been starled under co-ordinaüon of the Center Technology for Sustainable
Development, with the title: "Social acceptance of hiomass as a sustainable source of energy: consequences for
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